


HARDSPLOIT

Framework for Hardware Security Audit

a bridge between hardware & a software pentester



Who we are ?



- Julien MOINARD
 - Electronic engineer @opale-security (French company)
 - Security consultant, Hardware & Software pentester
 - Team project leader of Hardsploit
 - DIY enthusiast
 - Blackhat, NullCon, HIP, CansecWest, 32C3 speaker & trainer
- Yann ALLAIN
 - CEO
 - Blackhat, HackInThebox, HIP, speaker & trainer
 - Cybersecurity veteran (+ 20 years) / (old) electronic engineer
 - Former CSO of ACCOR (software domain)

Opale Security in 1 slide






Internet of Things & Privacy concern ?

- Any IoT object could reveal information about individuals
- Wearable Technology: clothes, watches, contact lenses with sensors, microphones with cameras embedded and so on
- Quantified Self: pedometers, sleep monitors, and so on
- Home Automation: connected households using smart fridges, smart lighting and smart security systems, and so on



How Will You Safeguard Your Data?





Internet of Things & Privacy concern ?



• Last news : (you can update this slide every week 😕)



VTech hack: Parents complain of Christmas disappointment

By Kevin Rawlinson BBC News

© 5 January 2016 | Technology

VTech was hacked in November, exposing millions of accounts.

In response, the firm took some essential services offline, meaning products could not be registered on Christmas Day.



Turning a Webcam Into a Backdoor


Posted by Vectra Threat Labs on Jan 12, 2016 5:00:00 AM

Firmware can be read without any problem (SPI memory)



lot Eco-system (20000 feet view)





Security speaking, hardware is the new software ?

Direct access

« Bridge » access



- Security products (Firewall, Antivirus, IDS,...)
- Security services (Pentest, Audit, ...)
- Tools (Uncountable number of them)

HARDWARE

To secure it:


• Few or unimplemented solutions (Encryption with key in a secure area, anti-replay mechanisms, readout protection, ...)



Hardsploit & hardware hacking basic procedure



- 1/ Open it
- 2/ Fingerprint all the component if you can else automatic brute forcing
- 3/ Use those that may contain data (Online / Offline analysis ?)
- 4/ Perform read | write operation on them
- 5/ Reverse engineering, find vulnerabilities and exploit them









10

Why?

- Because chips contain interesting / private data
 - Passwords
 - File systems
 - Firmware
 - ...


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0000020	0000	0001	0004	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
0000030	0000	0000	0000	0010	0000	0000	0000	0204
0000040	0004	8384	0084	c7c8	00c8	4748	0048	e8e9
0000050	00e9	6a69	0069	a8a9	00a9	2828	0028	fdfc
0000060	00fc	1819	0019	9898	0098	d9d8	00d8	5857
0000070	0057	7b7a	007 a	bab9	00b9	3a3c	003c	8888
0000080	8888	8888	8888	8888	288e	be88	8888	8888
0000090	3b83	5788	8888	8888	7667	778e	8828	8888
00000a0	d61f	7abd	8818	8888	467c	585f	8814	8188
00000b0	8b06	e8f7	88 aa	8388	8b3b	88f3	88bd	e988
00000c0	8a18	880c	e841	c988	b328	6871	688e	958b
00000d0	a948	5862	5884	7e81	3788	1ab4	5a84	3eec
00000e0	3d86	dcb8	5cbb	8888	8888	8888	8888	8888
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How?




• A hardware pentester need to know electronic buses and he need to be able to interact with them



Hardsploit framework






Hardsploit bus indentification & scanner

(in progress, not published yet)






Tool of trade



FUNCTIONALITIES	BUSPIRATE	JTAGULATOR	GOODFET	HARDSPLOIT
UART	O	Bus identification	*	\bigcirc
SPI	O	*	O	\bigcirc
PARALLEL	*	*	*	\bigcirc
I2C	0	*	*	\bigcirc
JTAG / SWD	\bigcirc	Bus identification	\bigcirc	\bigcirc
MODULARITY	Microcontroller	Microcontroller	Microcontroller	uC / FPGA
EASE OF USE	Cmd line + datasheet	Command line	Command line	Official GUI / API / DB
I/O NUMBER	< 10	24	< 14	64 (plus power)
WIRING	TEXT (but MOSI = SDA ☺)	TEXT / AUTOMATIC identification	TEXT	LED / TEXT/ AUTOMATIC identification

Hardsploit: Communication






16/03/2016

Prototype making

• Applying soldering paste (low budget style)








Prototype making



• Manual reflow oven (DIY style)





Prototype V0.1 aka The Green Goblin ③





Prototype making (with a budget)




• The rebirth



The board – Final version


- 64 I/O channels
- ESD Protection
- Target voltage: 3.3 & 5V
- Use a Cyclone II FPGA
- USB 2.0
- 20cm x 9cm





Hardsploit organization





Chip management



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			Hardspl	oit -	Chip editor 🗧 🗊				
	• • •	Name / Referer	nce:		24LC64				
		Description:			200 chars max				
	▼ Type ▼	Voltage:			● 3,3V ○ 5V				
r	BUS	Manufacturer:			MICROCHIP V				
	PARALLEL		MICROCHIP						
	SPI	Туре:			MEMORY V				
	I2C				MEMORY				
	SPI	Package:			TSSOP RECTANGULAR 🔻				
	PARALLEL	Not in the list ? Create a new one							
ORY	PARALLEL	Package name:			24LC64 200 chars max 3,3V 5V MICROCHIP MEMORY TSSOP RECTANGULAR 8 Square © Rectang Signal NA NA NA NA				
		Package pin nu	mber:		8				
		Package shape:			🔿 Square 💿 Rectang				
		Pin Number	Bus		Signal				
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	Create component	2	NA 🔻	NA	4				
		3	NA 🔻	NA	ł				
		4	NA 🔻	NA	l.				
1.13.47.2	V1 00 5W/V1 0 2	5	I2C ▼	SD	A				
	V1.00 SW:V1.0.2	6	12C 🔻	120	C_CLK				
		7	NA 🔻	NA	1				
		To complete th	is form, please	repo	ort to the component datashe				

Cancel Edit

- Search
- Create
- Modify
- Interact

an	rent chip	<u> </u>		Man	ufacturer	▼ Type ▼		
	4LC64		Reference	Туре	Manufacturer	BUS		
	 Manage Wiring 	1	P33-65nm		Numonyx	PARALLEL		
	Edit	2	25LC640	MEMORY	MICROCHIP	SPI		
	Template	3	24LC64	I2C				
	Delete ▼ I2C	4	M25P40	SPI				
	Settings	5	SST39VF802C-70-4I-EKE	PARALLEL				
	Commands	6	AS6C4008-55TIN	PARALLEL				
	Export							
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et.

16/03/2016



Harsploit - Wiring helper NA 8 NA 2 Click on a pin number or signal name to turn ON the corresponding LED NA I2C_CLK б Your chip (24LC64): 5 8 NA 7 NA 6 12C_CLK 5 SDA NA NA NA A0 1 8 🗍 Vcc NA A1 🗌 2 7 🗌 WP GUI <-> Board interaction A2 🛛 3 6 SCL 5 SDA Vss 🗌 4 Close Rotate Datasheet जिनि विविविविवि 3.31 representation 5.90 R Hardsploit Wiring module representation A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 AZ

Wiring helper



Settings



Hards	ploit – I²C settings 😑 📵 😣								
24LC64 PARAMET	ERS								
Base address (W):	A2								
Base address (R):	A3								
Frequency (Khz):	400 🔻								
Total size:	8192								
Bus scan:	Launch								
Address	R/W								
	Cancel Save								

	Hardsp	loit – Bus settings	• • •
5LC640 PAF	RAMETERS		
age size:		Total size (8 bits word):	4096
requency (MI	hz): 1.00	▼ Mode:	1 .
PI command	read: 3		Save
	P33-65nm PA		•
	Total size:	120000	
	Read latency:	1600	
	Write latency	in nanosecondes	
	Word size:	🔿 8 bits 💿 16 bits	
	Page size:	0	
		Cancel Save	

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Command editor




	H	lardsploit – Command	s	8				
م]	Current chip: 24L0	264				
	Name	De	scription	A				
1	Pointer	Write pointer of I2C	memory at 0x00 0x00					
2	Code	Read the first four b	ytes inside the I2C me					
3	Write 2 bytes at 2050 Write 2 bytes at 2050							
4	Read 2 bytes at 2050	50						
5	write chipno at 0x0	Writes chipno at 0x	0					
6	write 1	Writes the number	1 at 0×6					
7	write 2	Writes the number						
8	write 3	Writes the number	Action					
9	write 4	Writes the number	Execute					
10	READ PASSWORD	Read training board	Edit					
	WARD ADDINE AT ALC		Delete					
	Show command result	New Command	Template Next					

			Hardspl	loit – Command editor	•	•	⊗
Cu	irrent chip:		24LC64				
Cu	Irrent comm	and:	READ PASSW	/ORD			
Na	ime:		READ PASSV	VORD			
De	scription:		Read training	board password			
Co	mmand byte	es ari	ay:				
	Order	E	Byte (Hexa)	Description			
1	1	2		Payload size - low			
2	2	0		Payload size -high			
3	3	A0		Read address			
4	4	19		Payload byte			
5	5	00		Payload byte			
6	6	4		Payload size - low			
7	7	0		Payload size - high			
8	8	A1		Read address			
	Clone	-	+				
				Cancel		Edit	

What are available on github (Open) ?



- Microcontroller (c)
- API (ruby)
- GUI (ruby)
- Create your own Hardsploit module : VHDL & API (ruby)



Already available (github)



Parallel non multiplexed memory dump

- 32 bits for address
- 8/16 bits for data

Helping wiring

- I2C 100Khz 400Khz and 1 Mhz
 - Addresses scan
 - Read, write, automatic full and partial dump
- SPI mode 0,1,2,3 up to 25 Mhz
 - Read, write, automatic full and partial dump

SWD interface (like JTAG but for ARM core)

• Dump and write firmware of most ARM CPU

GPIO interact / bitbanging (API only for the moment)

• Low speed < 500Hz read & write operations on 64 bits

More to come (see online roadmap)...



- Automatic bus indentification & Scanner (@30%)
- Component & commands sharing platform (@90%)
- TTL UART Module with automatic detection speed (@80%)
- Parallel communication with multiplexed memory
- I2C sniffing (shot of 4000 bytes up to 1 Mhz)
- SPI sniffing (shot of 8000 / 4000 byte half / full up to 25Mhz)
- RF Wireless transmission training plateform (Nordic NRF24, 433Mhz, 868Mhz transcievers)
- Metasploit integration (module) ??
- JTAG
- 1 Wire
- CanBUS (with hardware level adapter)

```
...
16/03/2016
```

Concrete case


- An electronic lock system
- 4 characters pin code A B C D
 - Good combinaison Door opens, green L.E.D turn on
 - Wrong combinaison Door closes, red L.E.D turn on






Concrete case: Open it





Concrete case: Fingerprint








I2C MEMORIES 24LC64

Concrete case: Online / Offline analysis ?









Concrete case: hardsploit scenario



- 1. Open Hardsploit to create the component (if not exist)
- 2. Connect the component to Hardsploit (wiring helping)
- 3. Enter and save the component settings (if not exist)
- 4. Dump the content of the memories (1 click)
- 5. Change the door password by using commands (few clicks)
- 6. Try the new password on the lock system (enjoy)

Concrete case: Read | Write operation, I2C, SPI, SWD ...



• Time for a live demo ?


Parallel bus memory






Concrete case: Fingerprint







Concrete case: Offline analysis







Concrete case: Ready to dump the content



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Unsigned 8 bit:	23	Unsigned 32 bit:	386442284		Decimal:	023 008 164 044	
Signed 16 bit:	5896	Float 32 bit:	4,415118E-25		Octal:	027 010 244 054	
Unsigned 16 bit:	5896	Float 64 bit:	1,03014042409718E	-197	Binary:	00010111 00001000	10
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Conclusion



- IoT Device are (also) prone to vulnerabilities help you to find them
- Security policy need to be adpated, nowadays, it is not so difficult to extract data on IoT
- Designers need to design with security in mind
- Skills related to pentest a hardware device is mandatory for Security Experts (but training exist)
- Industry need to take care about device security





Thank you !

Hardsploit board is available at **shop-hardsploit.com (250 € / 277 USD / 370 CAD excluding VAT)** To learn more about Hardsploit and follow the development

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Hardware & Software, Pentest, Audit, Training