CERT-Conix tools: Machoke and BTG

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CONIX CyberSecurity
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Who am I?

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CERT-Conix

Machoke: CFG-based malware classification

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BTG: OSINT tool

Machoke: CFG-based malware classification

1. fuzzy hash

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3. clusterisation

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2. Used by academics
3. Used by other actors

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3. Used by other actors
4. few public implementations ...

1. Get something better than md5/sha* (resistant to small changes inside samples notably, etc.)
2. A fuzzy hash better than good old ssdeep
3. Get a small and independent tool easy to use and deploy at large
4. Let other tools do the clustering

1. Designed by ANSSI, published with Polichombr (https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/polichombr)
2. CFG-based fuzzy hash
3. 2 implementations: Ruby/miasm || Python/IDAPython (Machoc lost in lots of ruby/python/whatever code)

Machoke: Naming

1. Radare2 + r2pipe
2. Python

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Machoke: algorithm



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Machoke: algorithm

1. Blocks and call labelling

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2. Translate to text:
   1:2;

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   1:2;2:3,4;

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3. Murmurhash3: e38a5cbb

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Machoke: algorithm

1. Blocks and call labelling
2. Translate to text: 1:2;2:3,4;3:c,2;4:;
3. Murmurhash3: e38a5cbb
4. Repeat for each function in sample, concatenate hashes

Machoke: r2 commands used

1. aa
2. ilj
3. aflj
4. agj

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2. 10691 unique ssdeep
3. Only 4674 unique machoke hashes

Demonstration

BTG: OSINT tool

The SOC/CERT analyst stumbles upon an suspicious domain/IP (our observables) and then :

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6. Go on OTX and search for the observables
7. Go on some malware trackers and search for the observables

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So many sources of informations.

Help the analyst to get to the websites that contains info/intel about this observable quickly.

1. Ergonomy (less output is better)
2. Give the right informations to the analyst

1. python3 BTG.py [your observable]

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2. python3 BTG.py [your observables]
3. python3 BTG.py [name of file containing your observables]

[OSINT Source][Status]{Observable} Link to the ressource

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Example :
[malwareteks][FOUND]{ml314.com} http://hosts-file.malwareteks.com/hosts.txt

1. python3
2. 25 modules for 25 OSINT services
3. actively used and maintained @ Conix
4. observables handled: URL, MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512, IPv4, IPv6, domain

Demonstration

Github Conix-security :

1. https://github.com/conix-security/machoke
2. https://github.com/conix-security/BTG

Q/A

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